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More than 25 million working-age Americans remain unemployed or underemployed, the employment-topopulation ratio lingers at a near-historic low of 58.3 percent, 2 business investment continues at historically weak levels, and consumption expenditure remains weighed down by massive private sector debt overhang left by the bursting of the housing and credit bubble a bit over three years ago. Recovery from what already has been dubbed the "Great Recession" has been so weak thus far that real GDP has yet to surpass its previous peak. And yet, already there are signs of a possible renewed recession.
It is not only the U.S. economy that is in peril right now. At this writing, Europe is struggling to prevent the sovereign debt problems of its peripheral Euro-zone economies from spiraling into a full-fledged banking crisis -an ominous development that would present an already weakening economy with yet another demand shock. Meanwhile, China and other large emerging economies -those best positioned to take up worsening slack in the global economy -are beginning to experience slowdowns of their own as earlier measures to contain domestic inflation and credit-creation kick in, and as weak growth in Europe and the United States dampens demand for their exports.
Nor is renewed recession the only threat we now face. Even if a return to negative growth rates is somehow avoided, there will remain a real and present danger that Europe and the United States alike fall into an indefinitely lengthy period of negligible growth, high unemployment and deflation, much as Japan has experienced over the past 20 years following its own stock-and-real estate bubble and burst of the early 1990s. 3 Protracted stagnation on this order of magnitude would undermine the living standards of an entire generation of Americans and Europeans, and would of course jeopardize America's position in the world.
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Our economic straits are rendered all the more dire, and the just mentioned scenario accordingly all the more likely, The questions now urgently before us, then, are these:
First, why have the policies attempted thus far fallen so far short? And second, what should we be doing instead?
Answering these questions correctly, we believe, requires a more thorough understanding of the present crisis itselfits causes, its character, and its full consequences.
Regrettably, in our view, there seems to be a pronounced tendency on the part of most policymakers worldwide to view the current situation as, substantially, no more than an extreme business cyclical decline. From such declines, of course, robust cyclical recoveries can reasonably be anticipated to follow in relatively short order, as previous excesses are worked off and supply and demand find their way back into balance. And such expectations, in turn, tend to be viewed as justifying merely modest policy measures.
Yet as we shall show in what follows, this is not an ordinary business cycle downturn. Two features render the present slump much more formidable than that -and much more recalcitrant in the face of traditional policy measures.
First, the present slump is a balance-sheet Lesser
Depression or Great Recession of nearly unprecedented magnitude, occasioned by our worst credit-fueled assetprice bubble and burst since the late 1920s. 4 Hence, like the crisis that unfolded throughout the 1930s, the one we are now living through wreaks all the destruction typically wrought by a Fisher-style debt-deflation. In this case, that means that millions of Americans who took out mortgages over the past 10 to 15 years, or who borrowed against the inflated values of their homes, are now left with a massive debt overhang that will weigh down on consumption for many years to come. And this in turn means that the banks and financial institutions that hold this debt are exposed to indefinitely protracted concerns about capitalization in the face of rising default rates and falling asset values.
But there is more. Our present crisis is more formidable even than would be a debt-deflation alone, hard as the latter would be. For the second key characteristic of our present plight is that it is the culmination of troubling trends that have been in the making for more than two decades. In effect, it is the upshot of two profoundly important but seemingly unnoticed structural developments in the world economy.
The first of those developments has been the steady entry into the world economy of successive waves of new export- economy still is relied on to play as the world's consumer and borrower of last resort.
The second long term development that renders the current debt-deflation, already worse than a mere cyclical downturn, worse even than other debt-deflations is this:
The same integration of new rising economies with ever more competitive workforces into the world economy also further shifted the balance of power between labor and capital in the developed world. That has resulted not only in stagnant wages in the United States, but also in levels of income and wealth inequality not seen since the immediate pre-Great-Depression 1920s.
For much of the past several decades, easy access to consumer credit and credit-fueled rises in home valuesthemselves facilitated by recycled savings from emerging economies' savings -worked to mask this widening inequality and support heightening personal consumption.
But the inevitable collapse of the consumer credit and housing price bubbles of course brought an end to this pattern of economic growth and left us with the massive debt overhang cited above. Government transfer payments and tax cuts since the crash have made up some of the difference over the past two years; but these cannot continue indefinitely and in any event, as we argue below, in times like the present they tend to be saved rather than devoted to employment-inducing consumer expenditure.
Even current levels of consumption, therefore, will henceforth depend on improvements in wages and
incomes. Yet these have little potential to grow in a world economy beset by a glut of both labor and capital.
Only the policymakers of the 1930s, then, faced a challenge as complex and daunting as that we now face.
Notwithstanding the magnitude of the challenge, however, this paper argues that there is a way forward. We can get past the present impasse, provided that we start with a better diagnosis of the crisis itself, then craft cures that are informed by that diagnosis. 5 That is what we aim here to Together, these two developments -the rise of large export- The difference is the in The difference is the in The difference is the in The difference is the inability of the United States this time ability of the United States this time ability of the United States this time ability of the United States this time to channel the supply of excess capital that generated to channel the supply of excess capital that generated to channel the supply of excess capital that generated to channel the supply of excess capital that generated ephemeral bubble ephemeral bubble ephemeral bubble ephemeral bubble----era growth into real growth in common era growth into real growth in common era growth into real growth in common era growth into real growth in common incomes and, ultimately, wealth. incomes and, ultimately, wealth. incomes and, ultimately, wealth. incomes and, ultimately, wealth. This inability, in turn, stems from the same overhang of labor and capacity that generated the excess of global capital to begin with.
The statistics that underlie the graphs in Even if the worst of a debt-deflation is avoided, the process of de-levering will constitute an ongoing drag on aggregate demand and economic growth. De-levering destroys demand as households save more and consume less in order to pay down debt. In this case, the effect on consumption will be magnified by the absence of credit and asset-price rises of the kind that supported consumption prior to the collapse. With rising asset values, households were able to tap more credit to support consumption. They also felt wealthier and thus tended to spend more and save less. But credit-expansion and the wealth effect have now gone into reverse. And households will feel compelled to save even more to compensate for declines in their retirement savings and underlying property values.
Meanwhile businesses will remain reluctant to invest and add capacity until they see the outlook for aggregate demand improve, and until overcapacity in housing and other sectors is worked off.
The overarching challenge, then, is how to de-lever in a way that avoids worsening debt-deflation and corrects the serious imbalance between supply and demand in the global economy. This challenge is made all the more difficult by four additional factors that threaten to clog up the normal channels of economic recovery.
First, the rise in income and wealth inequality described in the earlier section will continue to worsen the aggregate demand problem and constitute an obstacle to economic recovery efforts -especially efforts that rely too heavily on monetary reflation and quantitative easing, since these measures tend principally to benefit asset owners while increasing the day-to-day costs of ordinary working
Americans. 10 Since, as noted above, income has shifted from labor to capital, from households to corporate firms, and from wages to profits, there has been an unremitting fall in aggregate demand. For households' and workers' marginal propensities to spend are higher than are those of firms and capital investors, meaning that redistribution from the former to the latter as has happened over the past several decades tends disproportionately to lessen demand.
This is an issue not just in the U.S., but also in China and most of emerging Asia as well as in Japan and Germany, where wages have grown much more slowly than productivity for a very long period of time.
Second, especially in the U.S., labor cost cutting by the corporate sector in response to the crisis also exacerbates the slow growth problem. Firms are not hiring, and keep firing, so as to "survive and thrive" and achieve earnings This was sensible at the time inasmuch as it did serve to stabilize the financial system, as had to be done. But it has now reached the limits of its effectiveness in supporting economic growth. Effectively zero interest rates have helpfully reduced the debt-servicing burden, but they cannot prompt businesses to invest when consumer demand is weak and when global and domestic capacity are more than adequate to supply that which is demandedhence the oft-cited analogy to "pushing on a string" in a liquidity trap. What's needed more now is to pull on the string, as we describe below.
Quantitative Easing (QE) offers diminishing returns: Quantitative Easing (QE) offers diminishing returns: Quantitative Easing (QE) offers diminishing returns: Quantitative Easing (QE) offers diminishing returns:
We are concerned that the diminishing positive effect on equities wrought by QE efforts, which underwrites fleetingly positive wealth effects, is eventually more than offset by the cost of rising energy and commodity prices that it might induce through a wall of liquidity chasing assets and a weaker value of the US dollar. For those act as a net drag on economic growth and push up inflation in emerging and other economies. Excess liquidity produced by extraordinary monetary easing did not, unsurprisingly, per our diagnosis of the challenge we face, flow into investment in new capacity for which there is no demand, but rather into money substitutes -tradable commodities.
While we expect QE to be a continuing part of policy as an offset to deflationary pressures, we anticipate that successive rounds of easing, if unaccompanied by the policies we prescribe below, will eventually only confirm expectations of protracted low growth and a Japanese-style U.S. yield curve. We do, as discussed further below, see benefit to more direct forms of credit easing tied to end users, as opposed to general QE aimed at stimulating intermediaries to lend. As suggested earlier, debt deflation amounts to a collective action problem; individually rational behavior renders tax cuts collectively ineffective. In these circumstances, temporary fiscal stimulus aimed only at diffuse, indirect demand stimulation via tax-cuts or income-support has little or no multiplier effect. As a consequence, the public debt burden increases faster than GDP, because the loss of revenue from the tax cuts is greater than the GDP it stimulates. The fact is that in a world of idle capacity and continued productivity growth, businesses can meet any current and medium-term demand without material pressure on wages or existing capacity. There has been a modest improvement in net U.S. exports, and this of course has been somewhat helpful to the economic recovery. But the improvement is largely a temporary result of the dollar's decline -a decline that is now ending with the push towards competitive devaluation elsewhere as in the 1930s and with the flocking of onceagain fearful global investors to "safe haven" dollardenominated investment assets. The recent modest boost in U.S. exports is also the temporary result in part of the very early stages of a domestic wage deflation that we now appear to be entering.
In a "normal" debt deflation, debtor economies that must : Also proposed by some, deliberate inflation is not a satisfactory option either, even if it be less dramatically misconceived than is austerity.
Higher inflation would admittedly help reduce the burden of outstanding debt, but it would also be difficult, if not downright impossible, to generate wage inflation sufficient to match asset-and consumer-price inflation, given the magnitude of our current excess reserve of labor both within and without our borders. We saw precisely that outcome while QE2 was underway. And without wage inflation, price inflation will actually add to the economy's woes, all while being, as a practical matter, in any event unsustainable. See Figure 6 , on the previous page.
A Grand Bargain of short A Grand Bargain of short A Grand Bargain of short A Grand Bargain of short----term stimulus combined with term stimulus combined with term stimulus combined with term stimulus combined with Such a program will inevitably raise concerns about the federal government assuming additional financial burdens.
But this is a short-sighted view. In fact, the program we are suggesting should be seen as taking advantage of a historically unique opportunity to put idle capital and labor to rebuild our economy at an extremely low cost and with potentially high returns given the slack in the economy.
We believe many -particularly those who now call for government austerity -are unmindful of this unique opportunity, hence unmindful of the opportunity-cost that their prescriptions would impose. Capital costs are now at historic lows -even for the longest of bond maturities, and labor is in abundant supply, precisely because of the present slump. It will never be less expensive than it is now to put these growth sources to work -indeed, back to productive work. It also will never be cheaper, as we now approach the zero lower bound in interest rates across the developed world, for the United States and other developed nations to finance their redevelopment efforts. That is especially true of the United States, thanks to the special privilege that it enjoys by virtue of the dollar remaining, for now, the world's primary reserve asset.
The fact is that trillions of dollars are lying idle because the private sector has no reason to invest given the sustained weak demand outlook. At this point, investors are quite content to sit on substantial reserves rather than take risk or even to "reach for yield" in longer term investments of any credit quality. Even the spreads between short and long term U.S. treasury yields indicate that investors are happier earning basically nothing and having complete flexibility with money. In other words, they are hoarding liquidity in the face of uncertainty over future investment prospects.
Hence it falls to public sector to put this capital to work.
Governments are the only entities that can extract economic utility from the present capital glut. Governments are not subject to the imperative to generate equity returns since they are not profit-generators. But they can create value by using this excess capital to make investments in the economic future that will redound to everyone's benefit.
Part V: The Way Forward in Detail: A Three-Part Recovery Plan
As noted above, we believe that the best way to satisfy the criteria just outlined is through a three-pillared program of (1) robust public infrastructure investment that stimulates sustained employment-generating demand growth and that renders the macro-economy more productive and efficient;
(2) comprehensive debt restructuring and financial reform that trim debilitating and growth-impeding debt overhang;
and (3) now. 15 Since most of these projects will need to be undertaken at some point, the question is literally not whether but when. Not to undertake them now would be to leave money on the table. Combine this consideration with the fact that labor and capital may never be noticeably cheaper than they are now and with the need to generate job creation and economic growth, then it becomes immediately apparent not to undertake massive public infrastructure investment now would be nothing short of financially irrational.
In light of the overwhelming need, on the one hand, and unparalleled opportunity, on the other, to restore both short-term and longer-term economic health through productive real public infrastructure investment, we propose the following program:
• A five-year public investment program in transportation, energy, communications, and water infrastructure; science and technology research; and human capital enhancement, which can be extended as needed.
• Target • An emphasis on high-return strategic investments in energy, transportation, and communications to eliminate economic bottlenecks and restore productivity, complemented by labor-intensive investments in energy efficiency (retrofitting homes, offices, and pubic buildings) to maximize job creation.
• Establishment of a national infrastructure bank, the expanded use of existing public-purpose credit facilities, and the use of existing bond issuance authority, so as to maximize investment at the lowest possible cost to the taxpayer.
• Tapping private capital markets additionally through issuance of Reconstruction Bonds by an agency established to fund and operate major public works program constructed under the auspices of the Directorate of Civil Works of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) mostly through private sector contracting.
• Offering multinational businesses the opportunity to fully repatriate profits from abroad with no additional taxation, on a dollar for dollar basis for all investments in the above mentioned Reconstruction Bonds.
• Expansion of the Directorate of Civil Works of the USACE to act as project manager and general contractor of last resort in order to limit private sector overbidding and labor union dominance -"build at a fair price, or we will build it ourselves." 16 We also advocate the streamlining and the speeding up of the environmental impact review process and the suspension of Davis-Bacon era prevailing wage laws that currently impact federally sponsored construction projects and those of many states as well.
The proposed five-year program would produce the following returns on investment:
• An average increase in national income (GDP) of 7 percent annualized during each quarter in which the program is employing incremental workers; 17 • an additional over 5.52 million jobs in each year of the five-year program, many of which would result in new skills training for lesser skilled workers;
• productivity and efficiency gains as completed projects reduce travel times as well as cost and frequency of remedial maintenance, and result in increased flow rates for people, products, power and information throughout the economy;
• substantially lower private and public costs and a higher quality of life including less pollution, lower energy costs, faster commute times, fewer traffic casualties, cleaner drinking water, and better educational facilities;
• the expansion of public capital (assets) and higher future tax revenues because of the economy's increased economic growth potential;
• reduction of the long-term federal government deficit because of higher tax revenues and lower government income-support program costs that result from higher economic growth and lower unemployment.
Pillar 2

Debt Restructuring and Regulatory Capital Loss Absorption Debt Restructuring and Regulatory Capital Loss Absorption Debt Restructuring and Regulatory Capital Loss Absorption Debt Restructuring and Regulatory Capital Loss Absorption
The resolution of trillions of dollars of impaired debt in the developed world is a problem at least as nettlesome as that of addressing unemployment and inadequate demand.
Indeed, this massive debt overhang must be addressed in order to be able to make sustained progress on lowering unemployment and boosting demand.
There are, as a practical matter, only four solutions to an unsustainable debt problem:
One. Strong economic growth can make debt sustainable; but growth in advanced economies will remain anemic as long as there is a need to de-lever.
Two. Net debt can be reduced by increasing savings; but Keynes' paradox of thrift suggests that if both consumers and governments simultaneously spend less and save more, the resulting recession and contraction of GDP will simply render the original debt unsustainable again. A macroeconomy cannot "save its way out of recession."
Three. Unexpected One reason is that they have focused principally on rescheduling and reducing interest, and not on principalreduction. A quarter of homes are now "underwater" -i.e., are market-valued at less than the debt on their mortgages.
One highly respected industry expert projects that, if nothing is done to ameliorate the present situation, roughly 8.3 to 10.4 million additional homeowners will likely default and lose their homes -out of the 55 million of mortgage loans currently outstanding. 18 This in turn will create additional downward pressure on the housing market, thereby putting in jeopardy even more mortgages. We therefore cannot afford to ignore principal-reduction as a critically important option.
Another problem with approaches attempted thus far is that they have relied heavily on monetary incentives provided by the government in order to induce creditors to act in their own interest. This has made the programs very cost ineffective.
Finally, the "one size fits all" nature of the programs attempted thus far renders them unnecessarily blunt instruments that assist only the relative few debtors whose difficulties they actually "fit." A more successful approach to the mortgage debt overhang and attendant mortgage market slump will have to be more nuanced and more granular than what has been attempted thus far.
In the Appendix to this paper, we lay out a highly structured and appropriately granular approach to getting the U.S. household debt overhang under control. The solution addresses the distinct issues facing each of the two parties to any debt contract -borrowers and lenders.
With regard to borrowers, we offer three independent solutions, addressing the three principal circumstances in which the vast majority of borrowers find themselves today:
1) Mortgages that are not under water and whose mortgagors face only temporary, recession-caused difficulties in remaining current. For this subclass, bridge loan assistance offers an adequate solution. 19 2) Mortgages that are under water and whose mortgagors will be able -and for whom it will indeed be financially rational -to pay off their debts only insofar principal is reduced so as to bring debt price and home value into closer alignment. For this subclass, a carefully crafted reduction plan akin to what we suggest in the Appendix will be necessary.
3) Mortgages whose mortgagees in ordinary circumstances would not have been up to the task of purchasing rather than renting homes -the proverbial "marginal" borrowers who were able to obtain "subprime" mortgage loans during the bubble years solely because they were bubble years, any regulatory forbearance with respect to delayed recognition of losses. We have therefore carefully crafted our proposals to avoid the prospect of any "free lunch,"
while also weighing the risk of moral hazard against the relative macroeconomic benefits and costs of debt reduction. Under our proposals, the parties to the suggested remediation must work for whatever benefit they East as well as other parts of the developing world.
Euro-zone Rebalancing
In the short term, the successful resolution of the European debt crisis is essential to avoiding a new global recession.
Over the slightly longer term, how the Euro-zone rebalances-whether by austerity or by successful reflation and restructuring-will dramatically affect how successful the United States will be with its own economic rebalancing. If Europe persists with its current austerity course, it will make U.S. debt de-levering that much more difficult. Thus, the United States-indeed the entire world economy-has an enormous stake in the course of economic policy in Europe.
The key, of course, is the position of Germany and its willingness to bear the burden of rebalancing and debt restructuring. The Euro-zone is a mini-global economy with its own imbalances between the core surplus economies of Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands and the deficit economies of the "periphery"-Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Greece. Ideally, Germany and other core surplus economies should pursue more expansionary policies while the peripheral deficit economies bring their deficits and debt levels under control.
But the economic philosophy of fiscal rectitude and sound money is deeply embedded into the German political economy, and Germany has resisted not only the kind of more expansionary measures in its own economy that would facilitate Euro-zone rebalancing but also some of the Euro-zone level initiatives that are needed to resolve the European debt crisis. As is well known, the Euro-zone is struggling to pursue the actions it needs to undertake to avoid financial and economic contagion-whether it be organizing an orderly Greek default, assembling a financial stability fund of sufficient size, or recapitalizing and guaranteeing its banks-because it does not have the necessary economic government institutions needed to act decisively and quickly enough to calm the markets. In this connection, the United States should do more to help build an international consensus around the kind of reforms China should be encouraged to undertake over the next five years to facilitate global rebalancing. Many of these are already widely accepted within the Chinese leadership but they will need constant pressure-and not just from the United States-to implement them and not to fall back on old ways. In short, these reforms include the following:
• Develop a social safety net Develop a social safety net Develop a social safety net Develop a social safety net. China (as well as other BRIC nations) must put in place a stronger social safety net, one that provides for reasonable levels of basic retirement assistance for the aged, full healthcare for those no longer able to work, and substantial reductions in the amounts of personal spending on healthcare -which in China is now nearly 50 percent of national healthcare costs.
Because China lacks a real safety net and does not have reliable public systems of health care, retirement, and education, Chinese workers are engaged in precautionary savings for these purposes. The best way to reduce this precautionary saving and augment demand would be to encourage China to do a better job of both providing education, health care, and retirement for its citizens.
• Increase wages and incomes. Increase wages and incomes. Increase wages and incomes. Increase wages and incomes. Precautionary savings by households is only part of the problem.
The much larger part of the problem has been business sector savings, especially those of stateowned enterprises. The essence of China's investment and export model has been the transfer of income from the household sector to producers.
One way to correct the imbalance that results would be for China to allow wages to grow faster than productivity to boost labor income and thus increase purchasing power for consumption goods.
This would also have the benefit of reducing the race to the bottom in labor costs and would allow wages and incomes to grow in other economies.
• • Reduce export subsidies Reduce export subsidies Reduce export subsidies Reduce export subsidies. Export subsidies to industry in China and other surplus nations constitute another significant drag on demand, and of course contribute directly to the oversupply problem in the world economy. Essentially for those reasons, they are also illegal under WTO treaty and case law. Export subsidies accordingly must be steadily and expeditiously phased out.
Recognizing, as we do, that export subsidies must be ended in phased fashion, we recommend that subsidies to industries in which the developed nations are most directly competitive -high valueadded manufactures for the most part -be ended soonest, while subsidies to more labor-intensive industries then can be phased out more gradually.
Ultimately, these measures will induce Chinese companies to improve general productivity and mechanization. The former will in turn redound to the benefit of the population of China, while the latter will provide attractive export opportunities for the high technology sectors of developed nations currently in deficit.
• A similar commitment could be made with respect to the "Eurobonds" that will eventually be necessitated by increased fiscal union within the EMU. Although controversial to both sides, direct investment into all but the most sensitive national security elements of industry - 
World Economic Recovery Fund
The third initiative on our proposed global rebalancing involves the establishment of a World Economic Recovery In the meantime, it is critical that we move expeditiously on the more immediate parts of the global rebalancing agenda outlined here: the successful de-levering of the U.S. private sector, the resolution of the European debt crisis, the successful rebalancing of the Chinese economy, and the establishment of a World Economic Recovery Fund.
Conclusion
We hope that we have succeeded in conveying both the unique magnitude, and the correspondingly unique urgency, of the problems with which the U.S. and global economies are now faced. This is no ordinary crisis, any more than the global supply shifts from which it ultimately stems have been any ordinary demographic developments.
The sudden growth in global productive capacity relative to absorptive capacity, inklings of which appeared as early as the 1970s and '80s but the full force of which did not gather until the 1990s, has for the time being overwhelmed the capacity of the developed world to adjust. In order to minimize the potential for moral hazard that might be occasioned by affording borrowers "something for o Second lien lenders that are subordinate to defaulted first mortgages would be required to establish additional reserves in an amount equal to that necessary to "cure" all defaults on the senior first mortgage -back interest, escrows, and penalties.
o Reserve provisions in respect of HELOCs secured by homes worth less than the amount of the first mortgage senior to the HELOC would also be increased to levels equivalent to those held in connection with fully unsecured debt, across the board.
o In connection with any HELOC loans held by lenders that continue to block co-equal modifications with first mortgage holders, the federal government, employing its eminent domain power to condemn property in the public interest, should take the subordinate mortgage lien only -not the mortgage note -for fair value. It is expected that fair value of a mortgage lien that is underwater will be nothing more than nominal.
